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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Australia’s policies towards asylum seekers hit the headlines when it refused to admit 
those aboard the Tampa in September 2001. This tough stance and the raft of legislation 
that followed became known as Australia’s “Pacific Solution”. It was clearly intended to 
deter those who might otherwise arrive by sea or by air to claim asylum in Australia. 
Several other countries toughened their policies after September the 11th 2001. This paper 
examines the effects of those policies on the subsequent streams of asylum applications 
by estimating the effects from panel data using a differences-in-differences approach. We 
find that the post-Tampa effect for Australia was to cut asylum applications by more than 
half. In other countries such as New Zealand and the UK, negative policy effects are also 
found but they are somewhat weaker. We conclude that the deterrent effects of policy are 
greatest not only when tough policies are enforced but when they are also widely 
publicised.   
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Introduction 
On 26th August 2001 a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, rescued 433 asylum 
seekers from their vessel the KM Palapa 1 that was in distress in the stretch of ocean 
between Christmas Island and the coast of Indonesia. At the insistence of the rescued 
passengers, the captain of the Tampa asked the Australian government for permission to 
land them on Christmas Island--a request that was refused.1 There followed a week-long 
standoff while the world watched the drama unfold. Eventually a settlement was reached 
under which a third of the passengers were taken to New Zealand and the remainder to 
the small Pacific island of Nauru, in exchange for an aid package of AUD 20 million 
from the Australian government. The Tampa saga redefined Australian asylum policy in 
the eyes of the world and it was watched keenly from Europe where stories about the 
clandestine entry of asylum seekers had been regularly hitting the headlines for a decade.  
 Throughout the 1990s the countries of the then EU-15 had grappled with the issue 
of mounting numbers of unsolicited asylum applications, a number that increased from 
92,410 in 1982 to a peak of 675,455 a decade later before falling to about 300,000 per 
annum for the rest of the 1990s. European governments progressively toughened their 
policies in an atmosphere of popular backlash against asylum seekers that increasingly 
painted them as illegals and scroungers, or at best as ‘economic migrants’. Those policies 
took the form of tightening access to individual countries’ borders, toughening refugee 
determination procedures and providing conditions for asylum seekers that were less and 
less hospitable. They were aimed at deterrence and they were intended as a clear message 
to asylum seekers: ‘don’t come here’. Yet there is disagreement about the effectiveness of 
such policies in the European context. Some have found that asylum seekers interviewed 
after arrival had only the vaguest notion about their host country’s policy. Some suggest 
that the fall in applications after 1992 owed much to changing conditions in source 
countries and relatively little to policies in destination countries. And others point out that 
trends in applications across the countries of the EU apparently bear little relation to 
differences in the toughness and the timing of policy changes in the respective EU 
countries (see Zetter et al., 2003; Theilemann, 2003; Hatton, 2004).  
                                                  
1 Whether Australia’s actions were consistent with international law is a debated issue. According to 
Hathaway (2002), it turns largely on the interpretation of the non-refoulement clause in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  
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 In this paper we examine the links between asylum policies and the flow of 
asylum applications in Australia. While Australia was the focus of attention (and a good 
deal of opprobrium) in August and September 2001, much less attention has been given 
to subsequent events. Here we look in detail at the evolution of policy and its effects on 
asylum applications before and after the Tampa incident. We shall argue that effective 
deterrence of asylum applications involves three elements, not just one. The first is the 
policy stance itself, which has a number of different dimensions and may be more or less 
draconian in its treatment of asylum seekers. The second is the enforcement of those 
policies. Policies that look tough but that are relatively easy to circumvent are unlikely to 
be an effective deterrent. And third, there is the effective communication of the country’s 
policy stance to the world in general and to potential asylum seekers in particular. These 
three elements—tough policies, credible enforcement, and effective communication—are 
standard criteria for effectiveness in other areas of policy such as regulation. We shall 
argue that these elements came together in Australia after the Tampa affair. In this sense 
the Australian government achieved its goal of deterrence. Our purpose here is only to 
show that policy was ultimately effective in achieving its goal—we do not argue that the 
goal itself is desirable.  
 
The evolution of policy in Australia 
Like most other countries, the fundamental basis for Australia’s asylum policy is 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, originally signed in Geneva in 1951. 
The two key provisions of the Geneva Convention are the definition of a refugee – 
someone who is outside his or her country of normal residence and has a ‘well founded 
fear of persecution’ (Article 1), and the so-called non-refoulement clause that prevents a 
refugee from being returned to a territory where his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened (Article 33). Countries that are signatories to the Convention are obliged to 
admit any foreign national who is on their territory, and who claims asylum, to a formal 
process that determines the status of the individual as a refugee. Those deemed to qualify 
must be granted refugee status under the terms of the Convention, although this does not 
necessarily mean permanent residence except insofar as it would be implied by the non-
refoulement clause. In principle this right must be accorded to a potentially unlimited 
 4 
number of genuine refugees. But there are many ways that policy can be used to limit the 
numbers while still observing the letter of Convention law, if not its spirit.    
Most of the refugees who were admitted to Australia were not ‘spontaneous’ 
asylum seekers who claimed asylum after arriving in Australia, but were part of 
organised resettlement programmes overseen by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). In 1981 a Special Humanitarian Program was established that 
afforded sanctuary to those whose persecution would not be severe enough to qualify as a 
refugee under the Convention but who have close ties, such as relatives in Australia. And 
in 1991 a Special Assistance Category was established for those escaping civil disorder 
but not necessarily in fear of persecution as defined under the Convention. A target of 
12,000 admissions per year for these categories in total was established in the 1980s and 
continued in the 1990s. The other categories are for so-called ‘onshore’ refugees—those 
who arrived in Australia, either legally or illegally, claimed asylum, and were granted 
refugee status.  
The number of visas granted under these various categories in the decade from 
1993/4 is shown in Table 1. Onshore refugees have only ever been a minority in the 
humanitarian program as a whole, but their share rose from 12.5 percent in 1995/6-
1997/8 to nearly 28.6 percent in 1998/9-2000/1, falling sharply thereafter. To put this into 
the context of total migration, between 1995/6 and 2002/3 about 80,000 per annum were 
admitted under the various streams of the migration program. The share of the 
humanitarian program in total admissions (migration plus humanitarian) declined from 
15.2 percent in 1995/6-1997/8 to 13.8  percent in 1998/9-2000/1 and 10.9 percent in 
2001/2-2002/3. .   
In the 1980s a number of initiatives were taken under the refugee and 
humanitarian programs, mainly for refugees from such places as the Soviet Union, East 
Timor, Mozambique and Cambodia.  In addition to these there were periodic arrivals of 
boat people that date back to the Vietnam War. The policy of mandatory detention for 
unauthorised boat arrivals, which had existed since 1958, was increasingly enforced, 
especially after the establishment of the first remote detention facility, Port Hedland, in 
1991 and it was extended to all unlawful arrivals in the Migration Reform Act, 1992. The 
gradual toughening of policy on detention and deportation was largely a response to 
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periodic increases in the number of unauthorised arrivals. From 1996/7 onshore grants of 
asylum were included within the 12,000 target so that they would effectively reduce the 
numbers accepted through the offshore programs (see Table 1). In response to a further 
surge of arrivals, legislation was passed in 1999 that created three-year Temporary 
Protection visas, with much reduced rights, for unauthorised arrivals who qualify for 
protection.2 And this was followed by legislation to sanction people-smugglers and to 
board, search and detain ships suspected of carrying unauthorised asylum seekers.  
From 1996 the Australian government urged other countries, particularly 
Indonesia and Malaysia, to tighten controls on potential asylum seekers transiting through 
their territories, and it reached a formal agreement with the former to intercept asylum 
seekers on their way to Australia. In October 1999 the government initiated an ‘overseas 
information campaign’ aimed at discouraging unauthorised arrivals.  It included posters, 
videos and media clips that were targeted at countries of origin and transit and distributed 
in local languages. This campaign was seen as largely ineffective. But the arrival of the 
MV Tampa on the scene was to change all that: it provided the kind of publicity that 
media campaigns could not buy at any price (see USCR 2002; Hathaway, 2002). During 
the week-long standoff at Christmas Island the world’s press feasted on the plight of the 
asylum seekers (mainly Afghans), and on the government’s hard line in refusing to allow 
them to land. Eight days after their rescue, the asylum seekers were transferred to an 
Australian naval ship the Manoora, which also picked up a further 200 (mainly Iraqi) 
asylum seekers from another boat, taking them all to Nauru. A further wave of publicity 
followed when some of the latter refused to disembark at Nauru. And the publicity 
continued with the arrival of a further six boats in the next month, several of which were 
‘pushed’ back out to sea.3 By that time the whole world knew about Australia’s “Pacific 
Solution”.    
                                                  
2 Temporary Protection Visas (TPV) confer the right to work and to certain benefits, including  Medicare, 
but a TPV holder is not entitled to re-enter Australia, once having left, and is not entitled to bring to 
Australia other family members. TPV holders were eligible to apply for permanent protection after 30 
months, a status that could be granted only where the need for protection was ongoing. Offshore refugees 
were normally given Permanent Protection Visas in the first instance, but from 2003 these were replaced 
with TPVs. Those who are accorded permanent protection are in a similar position to immigrants with 
Permanent Resident Visas, in that they can become eligible for family reunification and for citizenship.  
3 One of these, carrying 187 Iraqis, was boarded by naval personnel from the Australian ship the Adelaide. 
The Prime Minister reported to the media that some of these asylum seekers had reacted by throwing their 
children overboard—a claim that was later denied by senior naval officials.    
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Exactly a month after the Tampa rescue, the Australian Senate passed six new 
Bills into law to toughen the asylum regime further. The first two involved the excision 
of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef and some other small islands from Australian 
territory for the purposes of establishing claims to asylum in Australia, and they provided 
for such arrivals to be processed elsewhere. Applicants who had spent at least 7 days in a 
‘safe’ country prior to arriving in Australia were denied eligibility for a permanent 
protection visa. Another Act significantly narrowed the definition of a refugee used in the 
status determination procedure to the minimum required by the Geneva Convention. 
Further provisions included introducing harsher penalties for people smuggling offences 
and limiting access to judicial review of migration decisions. With these new regulations 
in place the “Pacific Solution” was complete, and by most accounts it helped the Howard 
government to win the election held on November 10th 2001.  
 
Asylum policies in other countries 
In the sections that follow, we assess the effects of policy by comparing trends in 
asylum applications to Australia before and after 2001 with those of other countries. Here 
we focus on the main English speaking countries of the developed world – Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States – as key comparators, plus France 
and Germany. Since a number of these countries also introduced changes in their asylum 
policies in 2001 we need to take those into account as well.  
 Like Australia, neighbouring New Zealand has onshore and offshore refugee 
programmes although on a much smaller scale, with an offshore quota of 750 per year. 
The number of spontaneous (onshore) applications was very small, but it rose sharply 
from the late 1980s, exceeding a thousand per year from the mid-1990s onwards. And 
like Australia, only a small proportion of these applications (about 10 percent) were 
approved, although larger proportion were granted temporary protection. In 1999 the 
Immigration Amendment Act provided that undocumented arrivals could be placed in a 
detention centre rather than being granted a temporary visa, and it strengthened the power 
to deport them without the right of appeal. But it was not until after the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center in the US on September 11th 2001 that this was enforced on 
the bulk of undocumented arrivals.  
 7 
 The United States and Canada also receive refugees through a combination of 
organised programmes and spontaneous applications. The US tightened its policy on 
unauthorised arrivals with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996. In the wake of September 11th 2001 the USA Patriot Act introduced tougher 
measures against those with suspected links to terrorist associations and in 2002 the US 
commenced fingerprinting all asylum applicants. Canada followed with the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act 2001 that brought its legislation more into line with that of 
the US. These measures also included speeding up processing and tougher measures on 
removals. It also agreed with the US a ‘safe third country’ policy: that asylum seekers 
would have their claims examined only by the country of first arrival. Most of the 
spontaneous asylum applicants to Canada filed their applications at ports of entry at the 
border with the US having first travelled through the US. Under the safe third country 
policy an applicant whose claim was rejected in one country would not be eligible for 
consideration by the other country. 
 In the UK a series of reforms have been undertaken, most notably in 1993, 1996, 
1999 and 2002 that progressively toughened UK asylum law in the face of rising numbers 
of spontaneous applicants. The 1993 Act introduced fast track procedures for claims 
deemed to be without foundation and it allowed detention for the first time. The 1996 Act 
introduced the ‘safe third country’ concept, thus denying claims from applicants who had 
previously travelled through safe countries where they could have sought asylum. It also 
restricted the availability of welfare benefits to asylum seekers. In 1999 the concept of 
‘manifestly unfounded’ applications was introduced, sanctions against carriers of 
undocumented immigrants were increased and asylum seekers in reception centres were 
more widely dispersed. And finally, the 2002 Act introduced an ‘asylum registration 
card’ and required regular reporting of all asylum seekers. In addition, an official list was 
introduced of ‘safe countries of origin’, applicants from which have their claims certified 
as clearly unfounded.  
 The UK case is particularly interesting because the dramatic toughening of policy 
in the 1990s seemed to have so little effect on asylum applications (OECD, 2001, p. 256). 
Although the vast majority of asylum applications were rejected, most undocumented 
asylum seekers were not kept under detention and a large proportion of those whose 
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claims were rejected were not removed from the country. Many simply went 
underground, living (and often working) as illegal immigrants. In the wake of a record 
number of applications in 2002 the Prime Minister pledged in February 2003 that the 
number of applications would be cut in half by the following September. This statement 
was based on the expected effects of the 2002 legislation (which came into effect 
between November 2002 and February 2003) as well as a campaign within the 
government for more effective enforcement of existing deterrent measures. And it was 
accompanied by a good deal of publicity, most of which expressed scepticism about 
whether the Prime Minister’s pledge was, in fact, deliverable.  
 On the European continent, France and Germany both severely toughened their 
policies towards asylum seekers in the early 1990s. These policies included carrier 
sanctions, ‘safe third country’ rules as well as procedures for expediting manifestly 
unfounded claims. And, until very recently, both countries denied recognition to those 
who were persecuted by non-state agents. Both countries provide benefits to asylum 
applicants in reception centres and Germany has a policy of dispersing asylum seekers 
across provinces (Länder). But except for illegal immigrants apprehended at the border, 
neither country employs mandatory detention. In 2001 Germany introduced anti-terror 
legislation that strengthened detention and deportation measures against suspected 
terrorists and it began to restrict the granting of humanitarian status to those who did not 
qualify as Convention refugees. But neither country introduced new deterrent measures 
comparable with those of Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  
 
Asylum applications in Australia 
Annual data for the number of onshore asylum applications are shown in Figure 1. 
These may be compared with the figures in Table 1 for the number of applicants that 
were accepted as refugees in the onshore program. Applications peaked at over 13,000 in 
1989/90 then fell off sharply before gradually rising to similar levels between 1999/2000 
and 2001/2. The earlier peak is associated with applications from places like China and 
Cambodia, while the gradual rise from the early 1990s reflected increasing applications 
from a more diverse range of sources. The lower graph shows the number of 
unauthorised individuals arriving by boat. This figure increased sharply from 1997/8 to 
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over 4,000 in each of the years 1999/2000 and 2000/1. The sharp fall in boat arrivals 
coincides with the much more restrictive environment post-Tampa. But it is notable also 
that the total number of asylum applications decreased by a far larger number—from 
13,000 in 2000/1 down to 5,000 in 2002/3 and only 3,500 in 2003/4. 
 The exact timing of the decline of asylum applications can be seen more clearly in 
the monthly data on asylum applications plotted in Figure 2. The monthly figures are 
more volatile but they averaged around 1000 a month up to September and then fell 
sharply thereafter to an average of close to 500 a month in 2002. The timing of the fall 
strongly suggests that it was the Tampa incident and the raft of legislation that quickly 
followed it that was the cause. Although the monthly numbers were volatile in the period 
up to September 2001 they fell decisively and remained relatively stable at the lower 
level thereafter.   
 In part this may reflect a decline in applications worldwide. Figure 3 shows the 
trends in applications in each of the five countries mentioned above, with 2001 quarter 3 
set at an index of 100. The graphs show that asylum applications to the English speaking 
countries were generally lower in 2002 and 2003 than before, but that applications to 
Australia fell more dramatically than any of the other countries. Applications to New 
Zealand and Canada both drifted downwards from the end of 2001 and the same was true 
of the United States from the middle of 2002. As we have seen, these countries each 
enacted legislation in 2001 or 2002 and so part of the decline may be due to tougher 
legislative conditions facing asylum seekers rather than a fall in the desire to seek 
asylum. The UK profile is particularly interesting because the numbers decline after the 
end of 2002, when legislation was followed by Tony Blair’s public commitment to halve 
the number of applicants.   Finally Figure 3 shows very divergent trends in two other EU 
countries, Germany and France. While the trend of applications in Germany follows that 
of Canada and the United States, France appears to buck the trend, with a continuing rise 
in applications after 2001.  
 One important difference between these countries is that origin country 
composition of their asylum applications varies widely. Figure 4 shows the composition 
of applications by continent for 1997-99. The first bar shows that the United States has a 
larger proportion of applications from Latin America and a smaller proportion from Asia 
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than the other countries. By contrast, Australia has the largest proportion from Asia and 
relatively small proportions from elsewhere.  The origin of asylum seekers varies widely 
across destinations for a variety of reasons, including proximity, language affinity and 
past history.  Since the eruption of civil wars and other sources of persecution vary year 
by year and country by country, the trends in total applications at different destinations 
will depend where in the world those conflicts occur as well as on differences in asylum 
policy. Any assessment of the effects of policy needs to take this into account.  
 
Regression analysis 
We first examine the quarterly data for total asylum applications that is shown in 
Figure 3. Because the absolute numbers vary widely across countries, we take the log of 
total applications as the dependent variable and we include a dummy for each destination 
(not reported). We estimate with a separate fixed effect for each quarter (19 fixed 
effects). This accounts for the variations in applications that are due to changes in the 
conditions that affect refugee flights world-wide, and hence it avoids the need to find an 
aggregate measure for wars and upheavals in origin countries. The effects of policy are 
captured by destination specific dummies that change from zero to one in the quarter after 
the policy takes effect. Since we also include individual destination country dummies 
over the whole period, the policy effects are essentially measured as differences-in-
differences.  
 The regressions in the first two columns of Table 2 include only the English-
speaking destination countries. We include policy dummies taking the value one for 
2002-Q1 onwards for Australia and New Zealand, and a policy dummy taking the value 
one for 2003-Q1 onwards for UK. Thus the trends captured by the period dummies also 
reflect the post-September 11th tightening of policy in the US and Canada and this serves 
as a benchmark of comparison for the policy effects in other countries. As column (1) 
shows the policy dummies have statistically significant negative effects on applications 
for New Zealand from the beginning of 2002 and for the UK from the beginning of 2003. 
These seem consistent with the policy changes outlined earlier and with the patterns 
displayed in Figure 3. For Australia the coefficient on the dummy that represents the 
‘Tampa effect’ is large and highly significant. This coefficient implies a drop in asylum 
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applications of 55.5 percent as compared with 28.8 percent for New Zealand and 24.4 
percent for the UK from 2003.  
 A number of studies have found that the flow of asylum applications also depends 
on labour market conditions in the destination (see Hatton 2004). Accordingly, column 
(2) includes the unemployment rate lagged one period, but contrary to expectation, this 
turns out to be positive and insignificant. Column (3) extends the dataset to include 
Germany and France and it includes ‘policy’ dummies for these countries that take the 
value one for 2002-Q1 onwards. Although the policy effects for the English-speaking 
countries are not much changed, the dummies for France and Germany are significantly 
positive and negative respectively.  Adding the unemployment rate has little effect on 
these coefficients although unemployment itself now becomes significantly positive, as 
shown in column (4). 
 These results for Germany and France caution us that the destination-specific 
dummies that are interpreted here as policy effects may, in fact, owe something to other 
underlying trends specific to each destination. As noted earlier, one of these is differences 
across destinations in the mix of asylum applications by country of origin. In order to 
investigate further we turn to analyzing data on applications by origin and destination. 
Here, only annual data are available and we have to drop New Zealand as a destination 
since there are too few observations for different origins. Our dataset for the years 1997 
to 2003 includes 17 source countries, drawn from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe (see 
Appendix).  
We take as the dependent variable the log of the number of applications from a 
given origin to a given destination and we include destination-specific dummies. The 
policy dummies take the value one for 2002 and 2003 for each destination (2003 only for 
the UK.). In order to account for the ebb and flow of origin-specific conflict we estimate 
using a fixed effect for each source and time period (17 sources ´ 7 years = 119 fixed 
effects). But we also need to allow for the differences in applications across 
destination/origin pairs that are due to factors such as proximity or historic and cultural 
links. We allow for these effects by including an additional variable: the stock of source 
country nationals who were living in the destination country in 1996—immediately 
preceding our data period. This can be viewed as a variant of the migrant stock or 
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‘friends and relatives effect’ that is often found to be important in studies of migration 
(Hatton and Williamson, 2005).  
 Because there is a larger cross-sectional element in these regressions, the 
coefficients in Table 3 are not as precisely estimated as those in Table 2 and the overall 
explanatory power (as reflected by the R2) is lower. Again the US and Canada are taken 
as the baseline for comparison. The result in column (1) for the English speaking 
countries alone gives a coefficient on the policy dummy for Australia that is similar to 
that obtained with quarterly data. The coefficient is significant and it implies that the 
Tampa effect was to reduce applications by 62.1 percent. The policy effect for the UK is 
similar to that found in the quarterly data but it is not significant. In column (2) the 
coefficient on unemployment is still positive but its inclusion has little effect on the 
magnitudes of the other coefficients. In these regressions the stock of origin-country 
population living in the destination country is strongly significant, as other studies have 
found. The coefficient implies that increasing the stock from an origin country by 1,000 
increases the annual flow of asylum applications by 9.2 persons per annum. 
Extending the dataset to Germany and France in columns (3) and (4) affects the 
policy dummies for the other countries only slightly. The dummies for France and 
Germany in 2002-3 are positive and negative respectively, just as they were in the 
quarterly data regressions. And although the coefficients are large, neither is significant. 
Overall, the results are consistent with those that were obtained from the quarterly data in 
one important respect: they consistently indicate that asylum applications fell after the 
Tampa affair by more than half. But the effect for the UK in 2003 has become 
insignificant, perhaps because it is identified from only one year of data.  While the 
coefficients for France and Germany in 2002-3 remain surprisingly large they also lose 
significance. It seems likely that the negative coefficient for Germany reflects a shift in 
applications towards the EU accession countries, which received a growing number of 
applications in anticipation of the eastward expansion of the EU’s borders.  But there is 
no obvious explanation of the upward trend for France.   
 
Conclusion 
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There has been a significant tightening in asylum policies all over the world in 
recent years. Most developed countries have increased their scrutiny of arrivals since 
September 11th 2001, especially those from regions that generate asylum seekers. Certain 
countries have implemented more draconian policies, with Australia being the best-
known example, followed by New Zealand and the UK. In each case the data reveal a 
decline in applications, suggesting that the respective governments achieved their aims of 
effectively deterring asylum applications. But given changing conditions in source 
countries and the changing attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees worldwide, it is 
not sufficient simply to observe the trend in applications for one country alone. The 
effects of policy can only be isolated by comparing different destinations and by 
controlling for changing conditions in origin countries.  
Our estimates largely confirm the trends that are observed in the raw data. The 
analysis of quarterly data gives particularly clear results: the ‘Tampa effect’ for Australia 
was to reduce asylum applications by more than a half. There were also significant 
reductions in applications to New Zealand from the beginning of 2002 and to the UK 
from the beginning of 2003. But the results also indicate a significant fall in applications 
to Germany and a significant increase in France from the end of 2001. When we 
disaggregate by country of origin, these results are largely confirmed although they are 
weaker in the annual data. The fall in Australian applications after 2001 remains large 
and significant, although the policy effects for the UK seem to be much weaker in the 
annual data.   
The results presented here suggest that, when tough asylum policies are enforced 
and when there are widely publicized, the effects on applications can be dramatic. The 
most important deterrent polices are restricting access to territory combined with punitive 
detention and deportation policies that prevent illegal arrivals from assimilating into the 
host community even though their asylum applications are unsuccessful. In addition, the 
Tampa incident served to communicate Australia’s tough stance to the world and it seems 
to have discouraged applications even among legal arrivals. There are two remaining 
caveats. First, even when the ebb and flow of conflict in source regions is taken into 
account, there are other forces that determine the trends in asylum applications that are 
still not fully understood. The second is that while policy seems to have been particularly 
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effective in reducing applications in Australia, and to a lesser extent in New Zealand and 
the UK, this should not be taken as an argument in favour of such policies. The fact that 
they are effective does not necessarily mean that they are desirable. 
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Data Appendix 
The main sources of data for asylum applications were UNHCR reports that can be found on the 
UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics. Data for quarterly asylum applications 
for the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2002 can be located in Table 2 of the UNHCR report, 
Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: Levels And Trends, 2000 – 2002 while data for 
the remaining quarters until 2004:3 was extracted from Table 1 of Asylum Levels And Trends In 
Industrialized Countries – Third Quarter 2004. The former report also provided annual figures for asylum 
applications disaggregated by the origin of asylum applicants and their country of asylum for the years 
2000 to 2002. Annual data preceding these years was taken from the statistical annex of Asylum 
Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980 – 1999. It is not possible to extend the dataset to the years 
before 1997 because the Australian data on applications by origin is not sufficiently detailed, with just a 
few origin countries listed and the rest included under ‘other and unknown’. We acquired the 2003 data 
from Table 8 of the 2003 Global Refugee Trends report. Additional data that were not available in the 
published reports were kindly provided by Christian Oxenboll of the UNHCR. For the UK revised annual 
data were obtained from UK Home Office, Asylum Statistics, United Kingdom 2003 (2nd edn.) at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/hosb1104.pdf.  
The 17 source countries used in the annual analysis are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from Asia; Algeria, Nigeria and Somalia from Africa; and 
Albania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine from Europe. Data for the stock of migrants from 
these 17 source countries who were residing in one of the 6 destination countries in 1996 was drawn from 
two main sources. The data for the UK, Germany and France on the stock of foreign nationals was obtained 
from the Council of Europe Demographic Yearbook for 2002 at http://www.oecd.org. For France the 
closest available year is 1999. For the US, Canada and Australia the stock of the foreign-born population 
was taken from the Migration Information Source website at:  
http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/. Missing observations for the United States were 
estimated by adjusting the number from the 1990 census using the change in the foreign-born from the 
origin region between 1990 and 1996. US Census data for 1990 was taken from Census Bureau, Population 
Division, Technical Working Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of 
the United States: 1850-1990 (by Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon) at:  
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html. 
All unemployment data was drawn from the OECD. Quarterly unemployment rates were accessed 
through the dX database, while the annual rates were taken from the statistical annex of the OECD 
Economic Outlook No. 76 (2004) EO76 Annex Tables at http://www.oecd.org. 
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Table 1 
Refugee and Humanitarian Visas Granted in Australia, 1993/4 to 20002/3 
 
Year Refugee Special 
Humanitarian 
Program 
Special 
Assistance 
Category 
Onshore  
Refugees 
Total 
1993/4 4,300 2,500 5,800 1,890 14,490 
1994/5 3,990 3,680 5,500 1,480 14,700 
1995/6 4,640 3,500 6,900 1,200 16,250 
1996/7 3,330 2,580 3,700 2,250 11,900 
1997/8 4,010 4,640 1,820 1,590 12,060 
1998/9 3,990 5,350 1,190 1,830 11,360 
1999/2000 3,800 3,050 650 2,460 9,960 
2000/01 4,000 3,120 880 5,740 13,730 
2001/02 4,160 4,260 40 3,900 12,350 
2002/03 4,380 7,280 -- 870 12,530 
 
Source: DIMIA 2003, p. 29. 
Notes: The Onshore Refugees category includes a small number of temporary humanitarian visas.  
 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of Policy Effects: Quarterly Data 
(Fixed effects regression; Dependent variable: log applications) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New Zealand Dummy  
(from 2002 Q1) 
-0.34 
(4.1) 
-0.27 
(2.5) 
-0.35 
(3.7) 
-0.21 
(1.9) 
UK Dummy 
(from 2003Q2) 
-0.28 
(3.3) 
-0.25 
(2.8) 
-0.34 
(3.7) 
-0.27 
(2.7) 
Australia Dummy 
(from 2001Q4) 
-0.81 
(9.7) 
-0.77 
(8.3) 
-0.82 
(8.7) 
-0.74 
(7.4) 
Germany Dummy 
(from 2002Q1) 
  -0.19 
(2.0) 
-0.22 
(2.4) 
France Dummy 
(from 2002Q1) 
  0.52 
(5.4) 
0.58 
(5.9) 
Unemployment rate  
(t-1) 
 0.04 
(1.0) 
 0.08 
(2.2) 
R2 (within) 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.83 
No. Obs. 95 95 133 133 
HETERO, c2 (1) 0.00 0.03 0.19 1.09 
RESET, F(3, n-k-3) 0.25 0.23 1.38 0.45 
 
 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. Nineteen quarterly country observations by 5 countries in 
columns (1) and (2) and by 7 countries in columns (3) and (4). Also included is a fixed effect for each 
quarter and a set of country dummies.     
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Table 3 
Estimates of Policy Effects: Annual Data 
(Fixed effects regression; Dependent variable: log applications) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK Dummy 
(2003) 
-0.35 
(1.0) 
-0.30 
(0.7) 
-0.31 
(1.0) 
-0.37 
(1.0) 
Australia Dummy 
(2002-3) 
-0.97 
(3.1) 
-0.91 
(2.7) 
-0.97 
(3.3) 
-1.01 
(3.2) 
Germany Dummy 
(2002-3) 
  -0.54 
(1.5) 
-0.53 
(1.5) 
France Dummy 
(2002-3) 
  0.50 
(1.8) 
-0.46 
(1.5) 
Log Foreign Stock 
(1996) 
0.44 
(9.4) 
0.44 
(5.1) 
0.51 
(9.1) 
0.51 
(9.1) 
Unemployment rate  
(t) 
 0.04 
(0.2) 
 -0.04 
(0.3) 
R2 (within) 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.37 
No. Obs. 469 469 700 700 
RESET, F(3, n-k-3) 3.03 3.14 1.22 1.22 
 
Notes:  t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by origin and date. Seven annual observations 
by 17 origin countries by 4 destinations in columns (1) and (2) and by 6 destinations in columns (3) and (4). 
The full dataset is reduced from 714 to 700 observations because of missing data on applications from 
Indonesia to the UK and France. Also included in the regressions are fixed effects for each origin by year 
and dummies for each destination. 
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Sources: York (2003) part 9 and DIMIA (2004) p. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
Asylum Applications and Unauthorised Boat Arrivals in Australia, 
1989/90 to 2003/4
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Sources: UNHCR Website; for 2001: Asylum Trends in Europe, North America, Australia and New 
Zealand 1999 - 2001, Updated tables; for 2002: Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: 
Levels and Trends, 2000 – 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2
Monthly Asylum Applications to Australia, 2001 and 2002
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Sources: UNHCR website; for 2000 to 2002: Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: 
Levels And Trends, 2000 – 2002; for 2003 to 2004: Asylum Levels And Trends in Industrialized Countries – 
Third Quarter 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Quarterly Asylum Applications in Selected Countries
 2001-Q1 to 2004-Q3
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Source: UNHCR website: Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980 – 1999.  
Note: These are the most recent years for which the UNHCR reports the origin of asylum applications as 
continental aggregations. New Zealand is omitted because the data by origin are incomplete. 
 
 
Figure 4
Origin of asylum applicants by region, 1997-1999
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